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Jedes Zeichen scheint allein tot. Was gibt ihm Leben?—  
Im Gebrauch lebt es. Hat es da den lebenden Atem in sich?—
Oder ist der Gebrauch sein Atem?
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? –
In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? –
Or is the use its life?
Wittgenstein (2006[1933]432.)
1. What is turning and what is iconic in the iconic turn? 
Media are not only a means of communication. From a cognitive perspec-
tive, they may be viewed as components of an external, auxiliary memory 
system (Schönpﬂug 1997), and contemporary cognitive science “construes 
cognition as a complex system in which cognitive processes are ‘embod-
ied, situated’ in environments, and ‘distributed’ across people and artifacts” 
(Nersessian 2007: 2). In man-machine communication, man-man-communi-
cation via digital machinery and especially in the World Wide Web (Heintz 
2006, Steels 2006) the “external” components of this system have taken on 
more and more of the characteristics of our individual, “internal”, living 
and active memory with its richness of sensual and symbolic formats. The 
intellectual challenge in the drafts of the “masterminds” of hypertext (Ei-
senstein) and multimedia (Lintsbakh) was the detection of temporal/spatial, 
mathematical and linguistic correspondences between such different sensual 
and symbolic representations (Bulgakova 2007, Tsivian 2007). 
The so called “iconic” or “pictorial turn” was pulled along by the digital 
turn, and it may in turn have stimulated and accelerated the digital turn. 
And the increasing supply of pictorial materials—in TV, computer games, 
and the World Wide Web—may well have changed our visual literacy and 
our routines in the use of different kinds of pictures: The so called Flynn ef-
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fect—the signiﬁcant improvement in test intelligence observed during the 
last decades—is assumed to reﬂect such tendencies (Neisser 1998), because 
this gain mainly affects subtests designed to measure non-verbal reasoning.
But what is turning and what is iconic in the iconic turn? The term iconic 
turn would imply a shift, i.e. an increase of iconic representations at the ex-
pense of non-iconic representations. But the World Wide Web is not a new 
single medium. Its users can upload or select texts, pictures and music ﬁles 
e.g. in order to “associate tags with these materials” (Steels 2006: 287). It 
has brought an increase of all types of “representation” and of course also 
an increasing supply of productions uniting such representations, such as in 
ordinary movies. The supply of pictorial material, let alone icons in a narrow 
sense of the word, by no means grew at the expense of e.g. texts or music, 
and perhaps not even any faster than the supply of such other materials. 
Thus the “iconic turn” is not really a turn. But what is iconic in this so called 
“turn”? 
Inspired by the idea that the computer might overcome the book or even 
writing in general, the focus of the media debate has shifted from the relation 
between speech and written text to the relation between language and picture 
(Koch & Krämer 1997: 19). What are the differences between the linguistic 
and the pictorial format? And what are their common features, especially in 
those pictures most commonly called “icons”? 
In the following section I shall reconstruct relevant semiotic arguments 
and boil them down to a point concerning our quest (in Section 3) for ico-
nicity in the “iconic turn”. These arguments of course regard the nature of 
iconicity but cannot be discussed separately from the even more general 
question of how to deﬁne the sign. To be “in use” (see the above motto by 
Wittgenstein), i.e. to be produced and/or interpreted—is this a characteriza-
tion of sign in function, or, more fundamentally, a precondition for the con-
cept of sign? Can we think of sign and reference disconnected from actual 
interpretation, or even from the existence of a cognitive subject in principle 
capable of such an interpretation? Or even disconnected from communica-
tion systems? And is it really consistent to extend the concept of sign beyond 
communication systems (cf. the note of the “natural sign” and the “symp-
tom”) and to restrict, at the same time, similarity relations to a particular sign 
called the “icon”? 
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2. Similarity in the index and in the icon
2. 1 Problems with “natural signs” and “symptoms” 
The index has always played a very special role in semiotic classiﬁca-
tion. Nöth (1997: 208 f) compares a “dogmatically dyadic” tradition differ-
entiating only between iconic and symbolic representations and extending 
from the Epicureans via Saussure “to the Radical Constructivists of today”1 
with a triadic tradition “extending from the Stoics to Peirce” who deﬁned 
the indexical sign, i.e. a third form of representation, “according to criteria 
such as causality and spatial or temporal contiguity”. These indexical signs, 
says Nöth, “are the most ignored ones in the theory of computational rep-
resentation.” I suspect, however, that the concept of the index was from the 
very beginning rather polyvalent and too wide for substantial applications. 
In Peirce, long the most frequently quoted semiotician, the concept of the 
index is so wide that it is an idle question whether or on which levels in-
dexicality plays a role in the man-machine dialogue and in “computational 
representation”. From an almost all-inclusive concept of the index follows 
an almost ubiquitous occurrence of indexical properties—inside and outside 
of information-processing and symbol-manipulating systems, irrespective 
of whether such a system belongs to artiﬁcial intelligence, as is the case of 
the computer, or to natural intelligence, as is the case of our “computer in 
the head”, and irrespective of whether it functions on the basis of electrical 
signals and in a binary code or electro-chemical signals in a mixed, digital/
analogue code. According to Nöth’s comparison, the present article inclines, 
though being free of constructivistic and of Saussurean ideas, to the “dog-
matically dyadic” tradition. Let us start with a rather undogmatic view of 
Peirce’s semiotic approach.
This view will focus on the trichotomy “most studied” in Peirce, i.e. the 
division of the sign into icons, indices, and symbols, and particularly on 
the deﬁnition of the index and its distinction from the icon. I shall precede 
it with a selection of the most informative passages I could ﬁnd in Peirce’s 
numerous writings and identify these paragraphs as “P1”, “P2”, “P3”, and 
“P4” in the subsequent analysis.
“An icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign.
The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an index. It is deﬁned as a sign which 
is ﬁt to serve as such by virtue of being in a real reaction with its object. For example, 
a weather-cock is such a sign. It is ﬁt to be taken as an index of the wind for the reason 
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that it is physically connected with the wind. A weather-cock conveys information; but 
this it does because in facing the very quarter from which the wind blows, it resembles 
the wind in this respect, and thus has an icon connected with it. In this respect it is not 
a pure index. A pure index simply forces attention to the object with which it reacts and 
puts the interpreter into mediate reaction with that object, but conveys no information. 
As an example, take an exclamation “Oh!” The letters attached to a geometrical ﬁgure 
are another case. Absolutely unexceptionable examples of degenerate forms must not be 
expected. /…/ It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can assert 
anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weather-cock does, or 
which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under a portrait does, does make an 
assertion, and forms a proposition.” (1976 [1904]: IV,  242)
“But a symbol, if sufﬁciently complete always involves an index, just as an index suf-
ﬁciently complete involves an icon. There is an infallible criterion for distinguishing 
between an index and an icon. Namely, although an index, like any other sign, only 
functions as a sign when it is interpreted, yet though it never happened to be interpreted, 
it remains equally ﬁtted to be the very sign that would be if interpreted. /…/ The only 
way in which an index can be a proposition is by involving an icon.” (1976 [1904]: IV, 
256)
“... every sign is determined by its object, either ﬁrst, by partaking in the characters of 
the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual 
existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by 
more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in 
consequence of a habit [which term I use as including a natural disposition] when I call 
the sign a Symbol. /.../ 
Indices, on the other hand, furnish positive assurance of the reality and the nearness 
of their Objects. But with the assurance there goes no insight into the nature of those 
Objects. The same Perceptible may, however, function doubly as a Sign. That footprint 
that Robinson Crusoe found in the sand, and which has been stamped in the granite of 
fame, was an Index to him that some creature was on his island, and at the same time, 
as a Symbol, called up the idea of a man. Each Icon partakes of some more or less overt 
character of its object.” (1906:495 f)
“(And since this is the trichotomy I have most studied, and consequently most frequent-
ly mention, I will here say that the division is into,1st, Icons, which represent their Ob-
jects by virtue of resembling them, as a geometrical ﬁgure in a geometry-book, or as 
any Diagram, or Array of letters in algebra, where the resemblance is not sensual but 
intellectual; 2nd into Indices , which represent their Objects by virtue of being  in fact 
modiﬁed by them, as a clinical thermometer may represent fever, or a letter attached to 
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a ﬁgure of a triangle may from its position represent an angle of the triangle; and 3rd into 
Symbols, which represent their Objects by virtue merely of the certainty (or probability) 
that they will be so interpreted; as any noun represents the thing for which it stands.)” 
(1976 [1908] III/2: 887)
We may note the essence of the index in Peirce: The index “represents” an 
object, draws attention to it and furnishes assurance of the reality of this 
object, by nearness and position (caption under a portrait; letter attached to 
a ﬁgure), “by being really and in its individual existence connected” with 
its individual object and by virtue of being “in real reaction” and “in fact 
modiﬁed” by it. Thus the index not only includes conventional signs, or, in 
terms of Langer (1942), “artiﬁcial” indices such as the letter attached to a 
ﬁgure, but also “natural signs” and “physical symptoms”.2 But even “natu-
ral” indices—such as the weathercock’s actual direction or footprints in the 
sand—may “involve an icon”. 
Peirce’s “infallible” criterion for distinguishing between an index and 
an icon (P2) would imply that the icon, unlike the index, does not remain 
“equally ﬁtted to be the very sign” as if interpreted.3 But why not? Are we 
really obliged to accept the actual direction of the weathercock (P1) as an 
icon instead of an index? And only because in Peirce’s terminology the in-
dex is not allowed to be similar to its object and to convey information about 
this object? Peirce’s “infallible criterion” (in P2) is, as far as I can see, not 
as clear as the criterion in an 1885 article where Peirce states that in the 
index there is “a direct dual relation of the sign to its object independent of 
the mind using the sign . . . . Of this nature are all natural signs and physical 
symptoms (3.361)” (Sebeok 1986: 49). But this older criterion contradicts 
the only criterion offered by Peirce for a general distinction between signs 
and non-signs: Signs are signs or become signs only by virtue of an interpre-
tational act. Keller (1995: 118) also copes with this problem of an all inclu-
sive sign by allowing the symptom a very special position within the signs. 
But he puts it the other way round: The symptom alone is a sign only when 
and as long as it is the object of someone’s actual interpretation, while e.g. a 
symbol in a book remains this very same symbol irrespective of whether or 
not it is interpreted by somebody. This is, I think, a likely attempt to prevent 
the concept of the sign from becoming empty. But both the approaches of 
Peirce and Keller have to manage with the co-existence of more or less au-
tonomous signs on the one hand and objects switching between existences 
as sign and non-sign on the other. 
Peirce characterizes the natural index as that sign which exists without any 
“utterer” and, as one would say today, beyond any code.4 And what is it that 
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makes something an icon? “No pure Icons represent anything but Forms; no 
pure Forms are represented by anything but Icons.” (Peirce 1906:513) The 
consequence when this criterion is applied to language: “The arrangement of 
the words in the sentence, for instance, must serve as Icons, in order that the 
sentence may be understood. The chief need for the Icons is in order to show 
the Forms of the synthesis of the elements of thought.” (Peirce 1906: 513). 
On the other hand, the “arrangement of the words” in the spoken or written 
sentence is, without any doubt, a matter of “position” and of temporal or 
local “nearness” to neighbouring words so that one should expect it being 
a case of idexicality. Needless to say that every sign in the narrow sense of 
the word, i.e. a component of a denotational system, necessarily functions at 
the same time as an index for other reasons as well, e.g. because they point 
to an “utterer” or author with this or that capability, intention, etc. Accord-
ing to Peirce (2.306) “it would be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to instance an 
absolutely pure index, or to ﬁnd any sign absolutely devoid of the indexical 
quality” (Spinks 1991: 64). 
Peirce’s explanations regarding the footprints (in P3) can hardly be un-
derstood without having in mind the whole set of such premises: The notion 
of a hardly existent “pure index” that does not convey any information; the 
pure icon representing nothing but a pure form; the implicational hierarchy 
in the ﬁrst sentence of P2; and Peirce’s notion (in 2.306, quoted from Spinks 
1991: 65) that indices “have no signiﬁcant resemblance to their objects”.
• Those footprints found in the sand by Robinson are, ﬁrst of all, an index 
for him that some creature was on his island. But since a pure index does 
not resemble its object and does not convey any information, they don’t 
tell Robinson what sort of creature this might be. 
• But they are also a symbol calling up the idea of man. We remember: A 
symbol represents its object by virtue merely of the certainty or prob-
ability that it will be so interpreted (P3, P4). This probability might be 
estimated as being higher in the footprints of another person than in the 
tracks of other creatures, including the imprints of the toes of different 
beach birds all around in the sand. And the probability that this person 
was still on the island might be rated higher in a man than in a seagull, for 
instance.
• But all that would not be sufﬁcient for a really complete sign, since a 
symbol, “if sufﬁciently complete, involves an index, just as an index suf-
ﬁciently complete involves an icon.” (P2) Thus the indices “force” the 
footprint “to be an icon” (P1) so that it partakes in some more or less 
overt character of its object (P2, P3).
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Our rather restrictive conceptualizations suggest a much more parsimoni-
ous characterization of those footprints: They are simply a case of indexi-
cal similarity, i.e. a similarity indicating a certain causer! It is, of course, a 
similarity relation that indicates whether the imprints in the sand come from 
a man, or a dog, or a bird. The hollows in the sand resemble the feet of the 
particular causer in the way a coin resembles a particular matrix, and they 
also resemble, less speciﬁcally, the footprints of other (adult, male) members 
of our species. By virtue of these similarities they indicate another (adult, 
male) person as a causer that may be assumed to be still on the island, if 
one takes into account additional indications, such as e.g. the fresh look of 
the track. They are, like the tracks of beach birds, by no means a symbol, 
because they are not components of a code or of a denotational system. And 
they are not icons, not even icons in the broader sense of the word. Only if 
there is an agreement that e.g. a certain gait would mean a certain warning, 
can the footprints take on a symbolic function and “attain semiotic status” in 
the sense of Sebeok (see Section 2.2). Cases of iconicity (at least in a broader 
sense, see Section 3.2) would be if somebody draws the outline of a foot in 
the sand using his ﬁngers, or if he moulds the sand with his hands in a way 
that the hollows look like a footprint, or if a youngster walks around in a way 
so that his track forms a heart or a boat. 
2. 2 Delimiting the concept of sign
All the above quotations and comparisons support, though not in a really 
systematic way, the view that Peirce’s trichotomy of the sign (icon, index, 
symbol) can—if at all (Eco 1979: 178)—only be understood as a distinc-
tion between “isolate dimensions” (Ransdell 1986: 56)5 or “different uses” 
(Pelc 1986: 14) of signs; or, following Peirce’s dictum (in P3) on the same 
“perceptible” that may “function doubly” as a sign, as different “functions” 
of signs (Fenk 1997)6. Corresponding terms (e.g. “the indexical function of 
a sign”) also avoid the misunderstanding of the symbol, index, and icon—in 
Peirce usually used as nouns—as distinct classes of sign. But even with such 
a conceptualization of the index or indexical function one risks, if  these 
terms are subsumed under sign or sign-speciﬁc functions, making the con-
cept of sign all-inclusive and hence empty. 
As far as I can see, a more tractable concept of sign can be achieved if 
we exclude the index from “external representations” and from sign-spe-
ciﬁc functions (Fenk 1997) and view indexicality as a fundamental cognitive 
principle pervading but also transcending referential systems and the world 
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of signs (Fenk & Fenk-Oczlon 2007: 889): The inferential or “indexical” 
interpretation of events is the essential function of our cognitive apparatus. 
Inference is much older and more fundamental than reference, i.e. the essen-
tial function of language. And it is a presupposition for reference. 
The exclusion of indexicality from the sign and from sign-speciﬁc func-
tions also means an exclusion of “indexical similarity”, without any com-
promise. Neither indexicality, nor similarity, nor indexical similarity is suf-
ﬁcient for external representation and for sign. This offers a clear position in 
the cases of indexical similarity discussed e.g. in Sebeok and eight decades 
before Sebeok in Martinak. To begin with Sebeok:
In countless instances, images appear naturally, but copies of this sort are ordinarily 
devoid of semiotic value: a man’s shadow cast upon the ground, his shape reﬂected in 
the water, his foot imprinted in the sand. Such everyday spatial images are necessarily 
endowed with certain physical, viz., geometric properties, but they attain semiotic status 
only under special circumstances. (Sebeok 1979: 123)
In the subsequent sentences Sebeok considers the possibility of a semi-
otic status at least in the last example, because here the image is “perma-
nent”; it does not disappear with (the luminous source or with) the model. 
Which is not really a valid argument: a word, for instance, is a symbol and 
a sign irrespective of whether it is spoken and thereby transitory, or written 
and thereby permanent or “frozen”. Martinak (1993[1901]: 30) shows more 
resolution in this respect. He points out that both the mirror-image and the 
photo—i.e. the permanent or “frozen” mirror image in terms of Sebeok—are 
so near to reality that one can hardly ask (in German) what they “mean” (be-
deuten) and what they are a “sign” (Zeichen) of.
We use the term “indexical similarity” to characterize cases of similar-
ity for which we cannot claim any semiotic status: the similarity between 
two animals indicating their relationship; the similarity between a tree and 
its shadow on the ground or between a bird’s toes and their imprints in the 
sand; between a face and its image in the water or in a mirror, or between 
this face and its (digital or classical) photo; between a leaping cougar and a 
video-record of the scene. In the ﬁrst examples similarity comes about by 
“natural” processes, in the latter by technical devices constructed, produced 
and released by persons. But the similarity we observe is not produced by 
these subjects! In order to illustrate the little but decisive step from “indexi-
cal similarity” to “iconic similarity”: If the man whose shadow we observe 
enacts a shadow play, positioning his arm, hand and ﬁngers in a way that the 
shadow resembles the silhouette of a swan or of a snapping wolf, then this is 
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a case of iconicity. At least in a broader sense of the term: 
2. 3 Delimiting the concept of the icon
If similarity is considered to be necessary for those external representa-
tions or signs which one may call “icons” or “iconic”, then it has to be a 
speciﬁc sort of similarity, i.e. the similarity established by a subject’s simu-
lating (imitating, modelling, …) activities (Fenk 1997). Figure 1 comprises 
what remains after the elimination of the index, including cases of “indexi-
cal similarity”: two basic types of representation and two possibilities to 
deﬁne the icon or iconicity.
 
Fig. 1: A rather broad (I) and a rather restrictive (II) conceptualization of the icon 
      (adapted from Fenk 1998: 305). 
The essence of this conceptualization: Symbols are those signs that en-
code or denote, by virtue of their rule-based use (Keller 1995), concepts and 
propositions. Some of these symbols, such as pictograms and onomatopoetic 
words, show simulative properties. We may call them “iconic symbols”, and 
this term is compatible with both Versions (I and II in Figure 1) of the deﬁ-
nition of the icon and iconicity. The inverse expression—“symbolic icon” 
–, however, would be tautological in view of the more restrictive Version 
II, because according to Version II only symbols can be iconic. I am sym-
pathetic to the more radical and, I think, more promising Version II. It is in 
line with those arguments foregrounding the symbol (allusively in Ransdell; 
our Footnote 5) and the existence of a code (Eco 1979: 121) but preserves, 
unlike in Eco, iconicity as a relevant function of speciﬁed signs. 
But I have to admit that these arguments shift some questions of deﬁni-
tion to the terms code and denotation. For instance: Despite the fact that in 
iconic signs the similarity between the representation and the represented is 
produced by somebody, one need not agree with Eco (1979: 200) that every 
mode of producing similarity necessarily follows a code and that the detec-
tion of produced similarity necessarily “requires a trained eye” and “must be 
simulation iconic
symbol
symbol
ICON I
ICON II
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learned”. Our highly developed abilities to detect patterns and similarities 
are much older than human culture, and iconicity is a means of using these 
abilities e.g. in order to establish a new code or new elements of an already 
established code.
3. Iconicity and indexicality in the New Media
In Section 1 we questioned the appropriateness of the term “iconic turn”, 
since the supply of picture material did not increase at the expense of the sup-
ply of e.g. texts and music ﬁles. One might reply that the digital technique 
used in the new media is in many cases per se a picturing technique—e.g. 
in the case of a digital camera or in the scanner that produces a picture of a 
text or a picture of a picture. But this argument would not hold in the light 
of our semiotic analysis in Section 2. When applying semiotic concepts to 
the media we have to distinguish between techniques, processes and prod-
ucts of creating something, and techniques, processes and products of stor-
ing, reproduction, duplication, transmission, distribution, and retrieval. The 
digital technique belongs, ﬁrst of all, to the latter. When used in order to 
record something—this “something” may or may not be iconic—the result 
is “only” a case of indexical similarity. The similarity between the record 
and the object of the record does not come about by a subject’s simulating 
activities. The digital camera may produce a picture of a person’s face (i), or 
of the mirror-image or a photo of this face (ii), or of a freehand sketch of this 
face (iii). In the last of these instances the object is iconic, but in none of the 
instances is the digital record iconic. Example (i) illustrates the simple case 
of the production of indexical similarity, and in the instances (ii) the record 
produces indexical similarity with something that has indexical similarity 
with the face. In (iii) the record of the iconic representation is no more iconic 
than the mirror image of the sketch would be. If, however, somebody uses 
his image in the mirror in order to draw a self-portrait, he produces some-
thing that is iconic at least in the broader sense of the term. 
“Indexical similarity” indicates a similarity between model and repro-
duction, but especially in digital “photography” this is something we never 
can be sure about. While the classical ﬁlm document is almost unforgeable 
(Matuszewski 1898), the digital technique offers outstanding possibilities 
for forgeries: It is no problem to extend the nose of a politician in a way that 
makes him look like Pinocchio, or to apply bullet wounds to the forehead of 
a terrorist leader who in reality is living in the best of health. Such forger-
ies are in fact iconic, and due to the potentials of digital communication it 
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is extremely difﬁcult to identify “indexes” indicating a forgery and pointing 
to speciﬁc falsiﬁers and to those who launched the forgeries in the World 
Wide Web. Less scheming are the digital reworks of the pictures of promi-
nent actors to make them look like prisoners (www.worth1000com, April 
27, 2007)
In such forgeries and reworks the digital technique is not simply used for 
recording, storing and transmitting something, but for modiﬁcations where 
the authors actually simulate something and thus really produce iconic 
representations. But the digital technique offers the potential not only for 
modiﬁcations of given originals, but also for creating “completely new” and 
“genuine” artefacts from the very beginning. 
On high artistic and technical levels this potential is used e.g. for the crea-
tion as well as the animation of ﬁgures in the “cyber arts” and in the hybrid 
arts, in “cartoon ﬁlms” and computer games, or for the creation and anima-
tion of blueprints of e.g. airplanes in computer aided design. At a ﬁrst glance 
one might deny the iconic character of forgeries, of fantastic images and 
of the drafts of an airplane with the argument that none of these creations 
simulates an object as (already) existing in our perceptual world. But, actu-
ally, our fantasy cannot invent and imagine “completely new” things. All our 
fantastic images go back to perceptually familiar materials and properties to 
form new combinations: as in the unicorn, which combines a horse with a 
narwhal horn, or in the soft watches in Salvador Dali’s “The persistence of 
memory” that exhibit properties of a face cloth or the ﬂow characteristics of 
heated plastic (watches). There is no medium that can go beyond this princi-
ple, irrespective of the tools available and of the ways they are used. 
On a lower level, graphic tools can be used for simple, non-animated 
drawings and drafts such as the logo in Figure 2. I was quite optimistic that 
the company in question would acquire this idea for an improved logo, but 
its agency in Germany did not want it for some reason or other. So I can use 
it here not only as a further example of iconicity as established by digital 
techniques, but, moreover, as a rather untypical instance concerning an as-
sertion in Wittgenstein (2006 [1933]): “We do not realize that we calculate, 
operate with words, and in the course of time translate them sometimes into 
one picture, sometimes into another.” (449.) One may add that usually we 
also do not realize that such mental images or “mental models” (Johnson-
Laird 1983) evoked by verbal expressions often become manifest in real 
pictures such as diagrams and pictograms. Pictograms are the prototypical 
icon that can be localized in the overlap of simulation and symbol in Figure 
1. And many logos are pictograms. A pictogram such as the well known post 
horn logo is a really “complete” sign: As a symbol it represents the country’s 
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postal service. As an icon it represents a post horn. And it offers unlimited 
indexical properties: From the place of application we may infer that this 
car or building is used or was used by the postal service, or that the “Hotel 
Post” was in use a century ago, and that the colour of the logo must have 
been refreshed very recently, etc. Pictograms can be viewed as elements 
of written schemata (Fischer 1997) and are used and interpreted in similar 
ways as synecdochic or metonymic verbal expressions. Figural thinking is 
reﬂected in both the diagrams of the special type called “logical, non-repre-
sentational, arbitrary pictures” and the corresponding ﬁgures of speech, i.e. 
spatial metaphors. These diagrams capture, as it were, different ﬁgures of 
speech that can be assigned to different metaphor families, such as the path, 
the inclusion, and the subsumption metaphors (Fenk 1994, 1999).
Fig. 2: A draft of a new logo for an old trademark
The results of digital recordings and transmissions resemble the model 
or reproduce it in analogue form. But this is a case of what we have called 
“indexical similarity“, not of iconicity, if iconicity is reserved for cases of 
similarity established by a subject’s simulating activities. The mirror, says 
Pirenne (1970: 11), “does not represent reality, it presents to us reality”. This 
is exactly what digital records do as well. But the “reality” presented to us by 
the mirror, or by a photo or the digital record, may of course be an artefact 
such as a cubistic portrait—an icon in the broader sense of the word—or a 
speciﬁed isotype by Neurath, i.e. an icon in the restricted sense of the word. 
The portrait by Picasso and the isotype by Neurath are as real as the real 
models of these representations. 
Endnotes
1 The Radical Constructivist E. v. Glasersfeld (1982:194), however, considers the 
Peircean approach to be rather promising, at least as compared with the approach of 
Ogden & Richards (1923).
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2 This distinction between conventional and natural signs calls up a related distinction 
in German between Zeichen (~ sign) and Anzeichen (~ indication, indicator). This 
is not a distinction that is used consistently, and in many cases Anzeichen can be 
replaced by Zeichen: The dark clouds on the horizon are not only  Anzeichen of a 
storm coming up; one may also say that they “mean” (bedeuten) or are a “sign” 
(Zeichen) of a storm coming up. But, conversely, Zeichen cannot in every case be 
replaced by Anzeichen, e.g. when there is direct talk about the utterer of a sign: 
“Zum Zeichen der Versöhnung gab er ihm die Hand.” (“As gesture of good will he 
shook his hand.”)
3 In terms of Wittgenstein’s metaphor (see our motto under the title of the paper), a sign 
not interpreted by anyone still exists but is not alive. This is one of several points 
where one is tempted to ask—in analogy to Rellstab’s (2007) question “How much 
Grice is in Peirce?”—how much Peirce there is in Wittgenstein.
4 Taking up arguments by Grice (1957), Sperber & Wilson (1986) investigate relations 
between communication and cognition and differentiate between a “code theory” 
and an “inferential theory” of communication. From their point of view, Peirce’s 
semiotic approach, or also the Saussurean semiological approach, “is a generalisa-
tion of the code model /…/ to all forms of communication.” (Sperber & Wilson 
1986: 6).  But, actually, Peirce’s generalization extends even far beyond communi-
cation.
5 According to Ransdell (1986: 56f) Peirce’s “conception of the symbol, along with the 
coordinate conceptions of the icon and the index /…/ can function in application 
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 only to isolate dimensions of the signiﬁcance in things, but not to classify or sort out 
things into distinct groups /…/.”
6 Similarly, Eco (1979) succeeds, despite of his radical rejection of Peirce’s “untenable 
trichotomy” (p 178) and especially of the notion of the “iconic signs”, in isolating 
different “modes of producing sign-functions” (p 217).
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